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Abstract: Web tracking has been extensively studied
over the last decade. To detect tracking, previous stud-
ies and user tools rely on filter lists. However, it has
been shown that filter lists miss trackers. In this pa-
per, we propose an alternative method to detect track-
ers inspired by analyzing behavior of invisible pixels.
By crawling 84,658 webpages from 8,744 domains, we
detect that third-party invisible pixels are widely de-
ployed: they are present on more than 94.51% of do-
mains and constitute 35.66% of all third-party images.
We propose a fine-grained behavioral classification of
tracking based on the analysis of invisible pixels. We
use this classification to detect new categories of track-
ing and uncover new collaborations between domains on
the full dataset of 4, 216, 454 third-party requests. We
demonstrate that two popular methods to detect track-
ing, based on EasyList&EasyPrivacy and on Disconnect
lists respectively miss 25.22% and 30.34% of the trackers
that we detect. Moreover, we find that if we combine all
three lists, 379, 245 requests originated from 8,744 do-
mains still track users on 68.70% of websites.
Keywords: online tracking; ad-blocker; cookie synching;
invisible pixels
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1 Introduction
The Web has become an essential part of our lives: bil-
lions are using Web applications on a daily basis and
while doing so, are placing digital traces on millions of
websites. Such traces allow advertising companies, as
well as data brokers to continuously profit from collect-
ing a vast amount of data associated to the users. Re-
cent works have shown that advertising networks and
data brokers use a wide range of techniques to track
users across the Web [2, 9, 22, 24, 31, 37, 38, 42, 43, 46],
from standard stateful cookie-based tracking [25, 43], to
stateless fingerprinting [2, 13, 24, 37].
In the last decade, numerous studies measured
prevalence of third-party trackers on the Web [2, 11, 12,
24, 31–33, 37, 43, 49]. Web Tracking is often consid-
ered in the context of targeted behavioral advertising,
but it’s not limited to ads. Third-party tracking has
become deeply integrated into the Web contents that
owners include in their websites.
But what makes a tracker? How to recognize that
a third-party request is performing tracking? To detect
trackers, the research community applied a variety of
methodologies.
The most known Web tracking technique is based
on cookies, but only some cookies contain unique iden-
tifiers and hence are capable of tracking the users.
Some studies detect trackers by analysing cookie stor-
age, and third-party requests and responses that set or
send cookies [31, 43], while other works measured the
mere presence of third-party cookies [32, 33]. To mea-
sure cookie syncing, researchers applied various heuris-
tics to filter cookies with unique identifiers [1, 24, 25].
However, this approach has never been applied to detect
tracking at large scale. Overall, previous works provide
different methods to identify third-party requests that
are responsible for tracking [43, 49].
Detection of identifier cookies and analysing behav-
iors of third-party domains is a complex task. Therefore,
most of the state-of-the-art works that aim at measur-
ing trackers at large scale rely on filter lists. In partic-
ular, EasyList [20] and EasyPrivacy [21] (EL&EP) and
Disconnect [17] lists became the de facto approach to
detect third-party tracking requests in privacy and mea-
surement communities [10–12, 23, 24, 28–30, 42]1. Ea-
syList and EasyPrivacy are the most popular publicly
maintained blacklist of know advertising and tracking
requests, used by the popular blocking extensions Ad-
Block Plus [5] and uBlockOrigin [47]. Disconnect is an-
other very popular list for detecting domains known for
tracking, used in Disconnect browser extension [16] and
in tracking protection of Firefox browser [26].
Nevertheless, filter lists detect only known tracking
and ad-related requests, Therefore, a tracker can avoid
1 We summarize the usage of filter lists in security, privacy and
web measurement community in Table 12 in the Appendix.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
01
51
4v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 S
ep
 20
19
Detecting Unknown Trackers via Invisible Pixels 2
this detection by using a different subdomain for track-
ing, or wholly register a new domain if the filter list
block the entire domain. Even though, the second option
is quite challenging because in such case, all the associ-
ated publishers would need to update their pages. Third
parties can also incorporate tracking behavior into func-
tional website content, which is never blocked by filter
lists because blocking functional content would harm
user experience. Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate
how effective are filter lists at detecting trackers, how
many trackers are missed by the research community in
their studies, and whether filter lists should still be used
as the default tools to detect trackers at scale.
Our contributions: To evaluate the effectiveness
of filter lists, we propose a new, fine-grained behavior-
based tracking detection. Our results are based on a
stateful dataset of 8K domains with a total of 800K
pages generating 4M third-party requests. We make the
following contributions:
1- We analyse all the requests and responses that
lead to invisible pixels (By “invisible pixels” we mean
1x1 pixel images or images without content.) Pixels are
routinely used by trackers to send information or third-
party cookies back to their servers: the simplest way
to do it is to create a URL containing useful informa-
tion, and to dynamically add an image tag into a web-
page. This makes invisible pixels the perfect suspects for
tracking and propose a new classification of tracking be-
haviors. Our results show that pixels are still widely
deployed: they are present on more than 94% of do-
mains and constitute 35.66% of all third-party images.
We found out that pixels are responsible only for 23.34%
of tracking requests, and the most popular tracking con-
tent are scripts: a mere loading of scripts is responsible
for 34.36% of tracking requests.
2- We uncover hidden collaborations between third
parties. We applied our classification on more than 4M
third-party requests collected in our crawl, we have de-
tected new categories of tracking and collaborations be-
tween domains. We show that domains sync first party
cookies through a first to third party cookie syncing.
This tracking appears on 67.96% of websites.
3- We show that filter lists miss a significant number
of cookie-based tracking. Our evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of EasyList&EasyPrivacy and Disconnect lists
shows that they respectively miss 25.22% and 30.34% of
the trackers that we detect. Moreover, we find that if we
combine all three lists, 379,245 requests originated from
8,744 domains still track users on 68.70% of websites.
4- We show that privacy browser extensions miss a
significant number of cookie-based tracking. By eval-
uating the popular privacy protection extensions: Ad-
block, Ghostery, Disconnect, and Privacy Badger, we
show that Ghostery is the most efficient among them
and that all extension fails to block at least 26% of
tracking requests.
2 Methodology
To track users, domains deploy different mechanisms
that have different impacts on the user’s privacy. While
some domains are only interested in tracking the user
within the same website, others are recreating her
browsing history by tracking her across sites. In our
study, by “Web tracking” we refer to both within-site
and cross-site tracking.
To detect Web tracking, we first collect data from Alexa
top 10,000 domains, then by analyzing the invisible pix-
els we define a new classification of Web tracking behav-
iors that we apply to the full dataset. In this section, we
explain the data collection process and the criteria we
used to detect identifier cookies and cookie sharing.
2.1 Data collection
Two stateful crawls: We performed passive Web
measurements using the OpenWPM platform [24]. It
uses the Firefox browser, and provides browser automa-
tion by converting high-level commands into automated
browser actions. We launched two stateful crawls on two
different machines with different IP addresses. For each
crawl, we used one browser instance and saved the state
of the browser between websites. In fact, measurement
of Web tracking techniques such as cookie syncing is
based on re-using cookies stored in the browser, and
hence it is captured more precisely in a stateful crawl.
Full dataset: We performed a stateful crawl of Alexa
top 10, 000 domains in February 2019 in France [7] from
two different machines. Due to the dynamic behavior of
the websites, the content of a same page might differs
every time this page is visited. To reduce the impact
of this dynamic behavior and reduce the difference be-
tween the two crawls, we launched the two crawls at
the same time. For each domain, we visited the home
page and the first 10 links from the same domain. The
timeout for loading a homepage is set up to 90s, and the
timeout for loading a link on the homepage is set up to
60s. Out of 10, 000 Alexa top domains, we successfully
crawled 8, 744 domains with a total of 84, 658 pages.
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For every page we crawl, we store the HTTP re-
quest (url, method, header, date, and time), the HTTP
response (url, method, status code, header, date, and
time), and the cookies (both set/sent and a copy of the
browser cookie storage) to be able to capture the com-
munication between the client and the server. We also
store the body of the HTTP response if it’s an image
with a content-length less than 100 KB. We made this
choice to save storage space. Moreover, in addition to
HTTP requests, responses and cookies, we were only
interested in the storage of invisible pixels. In our first
dataset, named full dataset, we capture all HTTP re-
quests, responses, and cookies.
Prevalence of invisible pixels: As a result of our
crawl of 84, 658 pages, we have collected 2, 297, 716 im-
ages detected using the content-type HTTP header. We
only stored images with a content-length less than 100
KB. these images represent 89.83% of the total num-
ber of delivered images. Even though we didn’t store
all the images, we were able to get the total number of
delivered images using the content-type HTTP header
extracted from the stored HTTP responses.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of
pixels in all collected images. We notice that invisible
pixels (1x1 pixels and images with no content) represent
35.66% of the total number of collected images.
Fig. 1. Cumulative function of the number of pixels in images
with a content-length less than 100 KB. 35.66% of images are
invisible pixels: 9.00% have no content (they are shown as
zero-pixel images) and 26.66% are of size 1x1 pixels.
We found that out of 8, 744 successfully crawled do-
mains, 8, 264 (94.51%) domains contain at least one page
with one invisible pixel. By analyzing webpages inde-
pendently, we found that 92.85% out of 84, 658 visited
pages include at least one invisible pixel.
Invisible pixels subdataset: The invisible pixels
do not add any content to the Web pages. However,
they are widely used in the web. They generally allow
the third party to send some information using the re-
quests sent to retrieve the images. Moreover, the user
is totally unaware of their existence. Hence, every in-
visible pixel represents a threat to the user privacy. We
consider the set of requests and responses used to serve
the invisible pixels as a ground-truth dataset that we
call invisible pixels dataset. The study of this invisible
pixels dataset allow us to excavate the tracking behav-
iors of third party domains in the web.
2.2 Detecting identifier cookies
Cookies are a classical way to track users in the web.
A key task to detect this kind of tracking is to be able
to detect cookies used to store identifiers. We will refer
to these cookies as identifier cookies. In order to detect
identifier cookies we analyzed data extracted from the
two simultaneous crawls from different machines. We
refer to the owner of the cookie as host, and we define
cookie instance as (host, key, value)
We compare cookies instances between the
two crawls: A tracker associates different identifiers
to different users in order to distinguish them. Hence,
an identifier cookie should be unique per user (user spe-
cific). We analyzed the 8, 744 crawled websites where
we have a total 607, 048 cookies instances belonging to
179, 580 (host, key) pairs. If identical cookie instance
appears in the two crawls, meaning that both the key
and the value are identical, we consider that the cookie
is not used for tracking. We refer to such cookies as safe
cookies. We found 108, 252 safe cookies instances. They
represent 17.83% of cookies instances.
Due to the dynamic behavior of websites, not
all cookies appear in both crawls. We mark as un-
known cookies, cookies (host,name) that appear only
in one crawl. In total we found 15, 386 unknown cookies
(8.56%). We exclude these cookies from our study.
We don’t consider the cookie lifetime: The
lifetime of the cookie is used to detect identifier cookies
in related works [1, 24, 25]. Only cookies that expire at
least a month after being placed are considered as iden-
tifier cookies. In our study, we don’t put any boundary
on the cookie lifetime because domains can continuously
update cookies with a short lifetime and do the map-
ping of these cookies on the server side which will allow
a long term tracking.
Detection of cookies with identifier cookie as
key: We found that some domains stores the identifier
cookie as part of the cookie key. To detect this behav-
ior, we analyzed the cookies with the same host, value
and different keys across the two crawls. we found 5, 295
(0.87%) cookies instances with identifier cookie as key,
This behavior was performed by 966 different domains.
Table 9 in Appendix presents the top 10 domains in-
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Fig. 2. Detecting identifier sharing. ”Sender” is the domain that
owns the cookie and triggers the request, ”receiver” is the do-
main that receives this request and ”identifier” is a cookie value
that we detected as identifier cookie. ”*” represents any string.
volved. The cookies with identifier cookie as key repre-
sent only 0.87% of the total number of cookies. There-
fore, we will exclude them from our study.
2.3 Detecting identifier sharing
Third party trackers not only collect data about the
users, but also exchange it to build richer users profiles.
Cookie syncing is a common technique used to exchange
user identifier stored in cookies. To detect such behav-
iors we need to detect the identifier cookies shared be-
tween domains. A cookie set by one domain cannot be
accessed by another domain because of the cookie access
control and Same Origin Policy[45]. Therefore, trackers
need to pass identifiers through the URL parameters.
Identifier sharing can be done in different ways: it
can be sent in clear as a URL parameter value, or in a
specific format, encoded or even encrypted. To detect
identifiers, we take inspiration from [1, 24]. We split
cookies and URL parameter values using as delimiters
any character not in [a-zA-Z0-9,’-’,’_’,’.’].
Figure 2 shows six different techniques we deployed
to detect identifier sharing. The first three methods are
generic: either the identifier is sent as the parameter
value, as part of the parameter value or it’s stored as
part of the cookie value and sent as parameter value.
We noticed that the requests for invisible im-
ages, where we still didn’t detect any cookie shar-
ing originate mostly from google-analytics.com and
doubleclick.net. Indeed, these domains are prevalent
in serving invisible pixels across websites (see Figure 13
in Appendix). We therefore base the next techniques
on these two use cases. First, we notice that first party
cookies set by google-analytics.com have the format
GAX.Y.Z.C, but the identifier sent to it are of the form
Z.C. We therefore detect this particular type of cookies,
that were not detected in previous works that rely on de-
limiters (GA sharing). Second, by base64 decoding the
value of the parameter sent to doubleclick.net, we de-
tect the encoded sharing(Base64 sharing). Finally, by
relying on Doubleclick documentation [19] we infer that
encrypted cookie was shared(Encrypted sharing). For
more details see the Section 10.1 in the Appendix.
2.4 Limitations
We detected six different techniques used to share the
identifier cookie. However, trackers may encrypt the
cookie before sharing it. In this work, we only detected
encrypted cookies when it’s shared following a specific
semantic set by doubleclick [19].
We do not inspect the payload of POST requests
that could be used to share the identifier cookie. For
example, it’s known that google-analytics.com sends
the identifier cookie as part of the URL parameters with
GET requests or in the payload of the POST requests
[8] – we do not detect such case in this work.
To detect the sender of the request in case of inclu-
sion, we use the referer field. Therefore, we may be miss
interpreting who is the effective initiator of the request,
it can be either the first party or an included script.
3 Overview of tracking behaviors
In section 2.1, we detected that invisible pixels are
widely present on the Web and are perfect suspects for
tracking. In this section, we detect the different tracking
behaviors by analyzing invisible pixels dataset
In total, we have 747, 816 third party requests lead-
ing to invisible images. By analyzing these requests, we
detected 6 categories of different tracking behaviors in
636, 053 (85.05%) requests that lead to invisible images.
We further group these categories into three main
classes: explicit cross-site tracking (Section 4.1), cookie
syncing (Section 4.2), and analytics (Section 4.3). We
refer to our detection method of these behaviors as
BehaviorTrack.
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Fig. 3. Classification overview. (%) represents the percentage of
domains out of 8, 744 where we detected the tracking behavior.
A tracking behavior is performed in a domain if it’s detected
in at least one of its pages.
After defining our classification using the invisible
pixels dataset, we apply it on the full dataset where we
have a total of 4,216,454 third-party requests collected
from 84, 658 pages on the 8, 744 domains successfully
crawled. By analyzing these requests, we detected the 6
tracking behaviors in 2, 724, 020 (64.60%) requests.
Figure 3 presents an overview of all classes (black
boxes) and categories of tracking behaviors and their
prevalence in the full dataset. Out of 8, 744 crawled do-
mains, we identified at least one form of tracking in
91.92% domains. We have further analyzed prevalence
of each tracking category that we report in Section 4.
We found out that first to third party cookie syncing (see
Sec. 4.2.3) appears on 67.96% of the domains!
Fig. 4. Top 15 domains and companies involved in analytics,
cross-site tracking or both on the same first-party domain.
In addition, we analyzed the most prevalent do-
mains involved in either cross-site tracking, analytics,
or both behaviors. Figure 4 demonstrated that a third
party domain may have several behaviors. For example,
we detect that google-analytics.com exhibits both
cross-site tracking and analytics behavior. This variance
of behaviors is either chosen by the developer, as it’s
the case for cookie syncing and analytics behaviors, or,
caused by other partners as it’s the case of cookie for-
warding. Google-analytics in that case is included by an-
other third party, the developer is not necessarily aware
of this practice.
Content type % requests
Script 34.36%
Invisible images 23.34 %
Text/html 20.01%
Big images 8.54 %
Application/json 4.32%
Table 1. Top 5 types of content used in the 2, 724, 020 third
party tracking requests.
We found that not all the tracking detected in the
full dataset is based on invisible pixels. We extracted
the type of the content served by the tracking requests
using the HTTP header Content-Type. Table 1 presents
the top 5 types of content used for tracking. Out of
the 2, 724, 020 requests involved in at least one tracking
behavior in the full dataset, the top content delivered by
tracking requests is scripts (34.36%), while the second
most common content is invisible pixels (23.34%). We
also detected other content used for tracking purposes
such as visible images.
4 Classification of tracking
In this section, we explain all the categories of tracking
behaviors presented in Figure 3 that we have uncovered
by studying the invisible pixels dataset. For each cate-
gory, we start by explaining the tracking behavior, we
then give its privacy impact on the user’s privacy, and
finally we present the results from the full dataset.
4.1 Explicit cross-site tracking
Explicit cross-site tracking class includes two categories:
basic tracking and basic tracking initiated by a tracker.
In both categories, we do not detect cookie syncing that
we analyze separately in Section 4.2.
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4.1.1 Basic tracking
Basic tracking is the most common tracking category as
we see from Figure 3.
Tracking behavior: Basic tracking happens when
a third party domain, say A.com, sets an identifier cookie
in the user’s browser. Upon a visit to a webpage with
content from A.com, a request is sent to A.com with its
cookie. Using this cookie, A.com identifies the user across
all websites that include content from A.com.
Privacy impact: Basic tracking is the best known
tracking technique that allows third parties to track the
user across websites, hence to recreate her browsing his-
tory. However, third parties are able to track the user
only on the websites where their content is present.
Fig. 5. Basic tracking: Top 15 cross-site trackers and companies
included in 8, 744 domains.
Results: We detected basic tracking in 88.67%
of visited domains. In total, we found 5, 421 distinct
third parties making basic tracking. Figure 5 shows the
top domains involved in basic tracking. We found that
google.com alone is tracking the user on over 5, 079
(58.08%) domains. This percentage becomes more im-
portant if we consider the company instead of the do-
main (Figure5). By considering companies instead of
domains, we found that, by only using the basic track-
ing Alphabet; the owner of Google; is tracking the user
in 68.30% of Alexa top 8K websites.
4.1.2 Basic tracking initiated by a tracker
When the user visits a website that includes content
from a third party, the third party can redirect the re-
quest to a second third party tracker or include it. The
second tracker will associate his own identifier cookie to
the user. In this case the second tracker is not directly
embedded by the first party and yet it can track her.
Tracking behavior: Basic tracking initiated by a
tracker happens when a basic tracker is included in a
website by another basic tracker.
Privacy impact: By redirecting to each other,
trackers trace the user activity on a larger number of
websites. They gather the browsing history of the user
on websites where at least one of them is included. The
impact of these behaviors on the user’s privacy could be
similar to the impact of cookie syncing. In fact, by mutu-
ally including each other on websites, each tracker can
recreate the combination of what both partners have
collected using basic tracking. Consequently, through
basic tracking initiated by a tracker trackers get to know
the website visited by the users, without being included
in it as long as this website includes one of the tracker’s
partners. Hence, through this tracking technique, the
user’s browsing history is shared instantly without sync-
ing cookies.
Fig. 6. Basic tracking initiated by a tracker: Top 15 trackers and
companies included in 8, 744 domains.
Results: We detected Basic tracking initiated by
a tracker in 82.07% of domains. From Figure 6 we
can notice that google.com is the top tracker included
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Partners # requests
pubmatic.com ↔ doubleclick.net 4,392
criteo.com ↔ doubleclick.net 2,258
googlesyndication.com ↔ adnxs.com 1,508
googlesyndication.com ↔ openx.net 1,344
adnxs.com ↔ doubleclick.net 1,199
rubiconproject.com ↔ googlesyndication.com 1,199
doubleclick.net ↔ yastatic.net 979
doubleclick.net ↔ demdex.net 790
adnxs.com ↔ amazon-adsystem.com 760
rfihub.com ↔ doubleclick.net 685
Table 2. Basic tracking initiated by a tracker: Top 10 pairs of
partners from different companies that include each other. (↔)
both ways inclusion.
by other third parties. By only relying on its part-
ners, without being directly included by the developer,
google.com is included in over 5, 374 (61.45%) of Alexa
top 8k domains while it owner companie Alphabet is
included in over 71.56% of visited domains. Google.com
is included by 295 different third party trackers in our
dataset. In our results we found that doubleclick.net
and googlesyndication.com both owned by Google are
the top domains including each other (176,295 requests
in our dataset). Table 2 presents the top 10 pairs of
partners from different companies that are mutually in-
cluding each other on websites. Note that in Table 2 we
don’t report mutual inclusion of domains that belong to
the same company.
4.2 Cookie syncing
To create a more complete profile of the user, third party
domains need to merge profiles they collected on differ-
ent websites. One of the most known techniques to do
so is cookie syncing. We separate the previously known
technique of cookie syncing [1, 24] into two distinct cate-
gories, third to third party cookie syncing and third party
cookie forwarding, because of their different privacy im-
pact. We additionally detect a new type of cookie sync-
ing that we call first to third party cookies syncing
4.2.1 Third to third party cookie syncing
When two third parties have an identifier cookie in
user’s browser and need to merge user profile, they use
third to third party cookie syncing.
Fig. 7. Third to third party cookie syncing behavior.
Tracking explanation: Figure 7 demonstrates
cookie syncing2. The first party domain includes a con-
tent having as source the first third party A.com. A re-
quest is then sent to A.com to fetch the content. In-
stead of sending the content, A.com decides to redirect
to B.com and in the redirection request sent to B, A.com
includes the identifier it associated to the user. In our
example B.com will receive the request B.com?id=1234
where 1234 is the identifier associated by A.com to
the user. Along with the request, B.com will receive its
cookie id = 5678 which will allow B.com to link the two
identifiers to the same user.
Privacy impact: Third to third party cookie
syncing is one of the most harmful tracking techniques
that impacts the user’s privacy. In fact, third party
cookie syncing can be seen as set of trackers perform-
ing basic tracking and then exchanging the data they
collected about the user. It’s true that a cross sites
tracker recreates part of the user’s browsing history
but this is only possible on the websites on which
it was embedded. Using cookie syncing a tracker not
only log the user’s visit to the websites where it’s
included but it can also log her visits to the web-
sites where it’s partners are included. What makes this
practice even more harmful is when a third party has
several partners with whom it syncs cookies One ex-
ample of such behavior is rubiconproject.com that
syncs it’s identifier cookie with 7 partners: tapad.com,
openx.net, imrworldwide.com spotxchange.com,
casalemedia.com, pubmatic.com and bidswitch.net.
Results: We detected third to third party cookie
syncing in 22.73% websites. We present in Table 3 the
top 10 partners that we detect as performing cookie
syncing. In total we have detected 1, 263 unique partners
performing cookie syncing. The syncing could be done
in both ways as it’s the case for doubleclick.net and
criteo.com or in one way as it’s the case for adnxs.com
2 Notice that in figures that explain a tracking behavior, we
show cookies only in the response, and never in a request. This
actually represents both cases when cookies are sent in the re-
quest and also set in the response.
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Partners # re-
quests
Sharing tech-
nique
adnxs.com → criteo.com 1,962 →DS
doubleclick.net → facebook.com 789 →DS
casalemedia.com → adsrvr.org 778 →DS
mathtag.com↔adnxs.com 453 →DS
trafficjunky.net ↔ traf-
ficjunky.net
415 ↔ DC, PPS
pubmatic.com → lijit.com 321 →DS
lijit.com ↔ lijit.com 303 ↔ DC
media.net ↔ media.net 302 ↔ DC, PCS
adobedtm.com → facebook.com 269 →DS
doubleclick.net ↔ criteo.com 250 → DC, PCS;
← DS
Table 3. Third to third party cookie syncing: Top 10 partners.
The arrows represent the flow of the cookie synchronization, (→)
one way matching or (↔) both ways matching. DS (Direct shar-
ing), B64S (Base64 sharing), ES (Encrypted sharing), PCS (ID as
part of the cookie), PPS (ID sent as part of the parameter) are
different sharing techniques described in Figure 2.
and criteo.com. In case of two ways matching we no-
ticed that the two partners can perform different iden-
tifier sharing techniques. We see the complexity of the
third to third cookie syncing that involves a large vari-
ety of sharing techniques. We also noticed that cookie
syncing can be done between two subdomains from the
same domain as it’s the case for trafficjunky.
4.2.2 Third party cookie forwarding
The purpose of the collaboration between third party
domains in third party cookie forwarding is to instantly
share the browsing history. Cookie forwarding has al-
ways been called “syncing” while instead it simply en-
ables a third party to reuse an identifier of a tracker,
without actually syncing its own identifier.
Fig. 8. Third party cookie forwarding behavior.
Tracking explanation: The first party domain
site.com includes A.com’s content. To get the image a
request is sent to A.com along with it’s cookie. A.com
then redirects the request to it’s partner (B.com) and
send as part of the URL parameters the identifier cookie
it associated to the user (1234 ) (Figure 8).
Third party cookie forwarding differs from Third to
third party cookie syncing depending on whether their is
a cookie set by the receiver in the browser or not. This
category is similar to third party advertising networks
in Roesner et al.and Lerner et al.’s work [43] [31], in
the sense that we have a collaboration of third party
advertisers. However, in our study we check that the
second tracker do not use it’s own cookie to identify the
user. This means that this tracker (B.com) is relying on
the first one (A.com) to track the user. In fact B.com
uses A.com’s identifier to recreate her browsing history.
Privacy impact: Third party cookie forwarding
allows trackers to instantly share the browsing history
of the user. A.com in Figure 8 does not only associate
an identifier cookie to the user but it also redirect and
share this identifier cookie with it’s partner. This prac-
tice allows both A.com and B.com to track the user across
websites. From a user privacy point of view, third party
cookie forwarding is not as harmful as cookie syncing be-
cause the second tracker in this case does not contribute
in the user’s profile creation but it passively receives the
user’s browsing history from the first tracker.
Results: We detected third party cookie for-
warding in 7.26% of visited websites. To our sur-
prise, the top domain receiving identifier cookie from
third parties is google-analytics (Figure 14 in Ap-
pendix). Google-analytics is normally included by do-
mains owners to get analytics of their website, it’s
known as a within domain tracker. But in this case,
google-analytics is used by the third party domains.
The third party is forwarding it’s third party cookie to
google-analytics on different websites, consequently
google-analytics in this case is tracking the user
across websites. This behavior was discovered by Roes-
ner et al. [43]. They reported this behavior in only a
few instances, but in our dataset we found 386 unique
partners that forward cookies, among which 271 are for-
warding cookies to google-analytics. In Table 10 in
Appendix, we present the top 10 third parties forward-
ing cookies to google-analytics services.
4.2.3 First to third party cookie syncing
In this category, we detect that first party cookie get
synced with third party domain.
Tracking explanation: Figure 9 demonstrates
the cookie syncing of the first party cookie. The
first party domain site.com includes a content from
A.com?id=abcd, where A.com is a third party and abcd
is the first party identifier cookie of the user set for
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Fig. 9. First to third party cookie syncing behavior.
site.com. A.com receives the first party cookie abcd in
the URL parameters, and then redirects the request to
B.com. As part of the request redirected to B.com, A.com
includes the first party identifier cookie. B.com sets its
own identifier cookie 1234 in the user’s browser. Us-
ing these two identifiers (the first party’s identifier abcd
received in the URL parameter and it’s own identifier
1234 sent in the cookie), B.com can create a matching
table that allows B.com to link both identifiers to the
same user.
The first party cookie can also be shared directly by
the first party service (imagine Figure 9 where A.com is
absent). In that case, site.com includes content form
B.com and as part of the request sent to B.com, site.com
sends the first party identifier cookie 1234. B.com sets its
own identifier cookie 1234 in the user’s browser. B.com
can now link the two identifiers to the same user.
Privacy impact: In our study, we differentiate the
case when cookie shared is a first party cookie and when
it is a third party cookie. We made this distinction be-
cause, the kind and the sensitivity of the data shared
differs in the two cases. Using this tracking technique,
first party websites get to sync cookies with third par-
ties. Moreover, pure analytic services allow to sync in-
site history with cross-site history.
Partners # requests
First party cookie synced through an
intermediate service
google-analytics.com → doubleclick.net 8,297
Direct First to third party cookie syncing
hibapress.com → criteo.com 460
alleng.org → yandex.ru 332
arstechnica.com → condenastdigital.com 243
thewindowsclub.com → doubleclick.net 228
digit.in → doubleclick.net 224
misionesonline.net → doubleclick.net 221
wired.com → condenastdigital.com 219
newyorker.com → condenastdigital.com 218
uol.com.br → tailtarget.com 198
Table 4. First to third party cookie syncing: Top 10 partners.
Results: We detected first to third party cookie
syncing in 67.96% of visited domains. In Table 4, we
present the top 10 partners syncing first party cook-
ies. We differentiate the two cases: (1) first party
cookie synced through an intermediate service (as shown
in Figure 9) and (2) first party cookie synced di-
rectly from the first party domain. In total we found
17, 415 different partners involved. The top partners are
google-analytics and doubleclick. We found that
google-analytics first receives the cookie as part of
the URL parameters. Then, through redirection pro-
cess, google-analytics transfers the first party cookie
to doubleclick that inserts or receives an identi-
fier cookie in the user’s browser. We found out that
google-analytics is triggering such first party cookie
syncing on 38.91% of visited websites.
4.3 Analytics category
Instead of measuring website audience themselves, web-
sites today use third party analytics services. Such ser-
vices provide reports of the website traffic by tracking
the number of visits, the number of visited pages in the
website, etc. The first party website includes content
from the third party service on the pages it wishes to
analyze the traffic.
Fig. 10. Analytics behavior.
Tracking explanation: Figure 10 shows the an-
alytics category where the domain directly visited by
the user (site.com) owns a cookie containing a unique
identifier in user’s browser. Such cookie is called first
party identifier cookie. This cookie is used by the third
party (A.com) to uniquely identify the visitors within
site.com. The first party website makes a request to
the third party to get the content and uses this request
to share the first party identifier cookie.
Privacy impact: In analytic behavior, the third
party domain is not able to track the user across web-
sites because it does not set its own cookie in user’s
browser. Consequently, for this third party, the same
user will have different identifiers in different websites.
However, using the first party identifier cookie shared
by the first party, the third party can identify the user
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within the same website. From a user point of view, an-
alytics behavior is not as harmful as the other tracking
methods because the third party domain can not recre-
ate the user’s browsing history but it can only track her
activity within the same domain which could be really
useful for the website developer.
Results: We detected analytics in 72.02% of vis-
ited domains. We detect that google-analyics is the
most common analytics service. It’s used on 69.25%
of the websites. The next most popular analytics is
alexametrics.com – it’s prevalent on 9.10% of the web-
sites (see Figure 15 in the Appendix).
5 Are filter lists effective at
detecting trackers?
Most of the state-of-the-art works that aim at measuring
trackers at large scale rely on filter lists. In particular,
EasyList [20] and EasyPrivacy [21] and Disconnect [17]
lists became the de facto approach to detect third-party
tracking requests in the privacy and measurement com-
munities [10–12, 23, 24, 28–30, 42]. Nevertheless, filter
lists detect only known tracking and ad-related requests,
therefore a tracker can easily avoid this detection by
registering a new domain. Third parties can also incor-
porate tracking behavior into functional website con-
tent, which could not be blocked by filter lists because
blocking functional content would harm user experience.
Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate how effective are
filter lists at detecting trackers, how many trackers are
missed by the research community in their studies, and
whether filter lists should still be used as the default
tools to detect trackers at scale.
In this section, we analyze how effective are fil-
ter lists at detecting third-party trackers. Contrary to
Merzdovnik et al. work [35], that measured blocking of
third party requests without identifying whether such
requests are tracking or not, we compare all the cross-
sites tracking and analytics behavior reported in Sec-
tion 4 (that we unite under one detection method,
that we call BehaviorTrack) with the third-party track-
ers detected by filter lists. EasyList and EasyPrivacy
(EL&EP) and Disconnect filter lists in our comparison
were extracted in April 2019. We use the python library
adblockparser [4], to determine if a request would have
been blocked by EL&EP. For Disconnect we compare to
the domain name of the requests (Disconnect list con-
tains full domain names, while EL&EP are lists of reg-
ular expressions that require parsing).
For the comparison, we used the full dataset of
4, 216, 454 third party requests collected from 84, 658
pages of 8, 744 successfully crawled domains.
(a) EasyList and EasyPrivacy (b) Disconnect
Fig. 11. Effectiveness of filter lists at detecting trackers on
4, 216, 454 third party requests from 84, 658 pages.
Measuring tracking requests We apply filter
lists on requests to detect which requests are blocked
by the lists, as it has been done in previous works [24].
We then use the filter lists to classify follow-up third-
party requests that would have been blocked by the lists.
This technique has been extensively used in the previ-
ous works [23, 28–30] (for more details, see Table 12 in
the Appendix). We classify a request as blocked if it
matches one of the conditions:
– the requests directly matches the list;
– the request is a consequence of a redirection chain
where an earlier request was blocked by the list.
– the request is loaded in a third-party content (an
iframe) that was blocked by the list (we detect this
case by analyzing the referrer header).
Figure 11 provides an overview of third party requests
blocked by filter lists or detected as tracking requests
according to BehaviorTrack. Out of all 4, 216, 454 third
party requests in the full dataset, 2, 558, 921 (60.7%) re-
quests were blocked by EL&EP, 2, 757, 903 (65.4%) were
blocked by Disconnect, and 2, 724, 020 (64.6%) were de-
tected as performing tracking by BehaviorTrack.
Requests blocked only by filter lists: Fig-
ure 11 shows that EL&EP block 661, 523 (15.69% out
of 4, 216, 454) requests that were not detected as per-
forming tracking by BehaviorTrack. These requests orig-
inate from 2, 121 unique third party domain. Discon-
nect blocks 720, 977 (17.10%) requests not detected by
BehaviorTrack. These requests originate form 1, 754 dis-
tinct third party domains.
These requests are missed by BehaviorTrack because
they do not contain any identifier cookie. Such requests
may contain other non user-specific cookies (identical
across two machines, see Sec. 2.2), however we assume
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Filter
list(s)
#
missed
requests
% of 4.2M
third-party
requests
% of 2.7M
tracking
requests
# do-
mains of
missed
requests
EL&EP 826, 622 19.60% 25.22% 5, 136
Disconnect 687, 094 16.30% 30.34% 6, 189
Table 5. Overview of third-party requests missed by the filter lists
and detected as tracking by BehaviorTrack.
that such cookies are not used for tracking. EL&EP
and Disconnect block these requests most likely because
they are known for providing analytics or advertising
services, or because they perform other types of track-
ing through scripts such as fingerprinting which is out
of the scope of our study.
5.1 Tracking missed by the filter lists
Table 5 gives an overview of third-party requests missed
by EL&EP and Disconnect filter lists and detected by
BehaviorTrack as performing tracking. The number of
third party domains involved in tracking detected only
by BehaviorTrack (e.g., 6, 189 for Disconnect) is signif-
icantly higher than those only detected by filter lists
(e.g., 1, 754 for Disconnect reported earlier in this sec-
tion). BehaviorTrack detects all kind of trackers including
the less popular ones that are under the bar of detection
of filter list. Because less popular trackers are less preva-
lent, they generate fewer requests and therefore remain
unnoticed by filter lists. This is the reason why we detect
a large fraction of domains responsible for tracking.
By further analyzing the requests only detected as
tracking by BehaviorTrack and missed by EL&EP, we
found that 118, 314 requests (14.31% of the requests de-
tected only by BehaviorTrack) are false positives due to
the simulation of EL&EP behaviour. BehaviorTrack de-
tects identifying cookies in requests missed by EL&EP:
these cookies were set by previous requests that would
have been blocked by EL&EP (note that our crawler is
stateful). As a result, by simulating the blocking behav-
ior of EL&EP, these cookies should be blocked by the
filter lists and not included in the analysis of the follow-
ing requests. Similarly, we found that 46, 285 requests
(6.73% of the requests detected only by BehaviorTrack)
missed by Disconnect are false positives. We exclude
these requests from the following analysis and we fur-
ther analyze the remaining 708, 308 requests missed by
EL&EP and the 640, 809 missed by Disconnect.
Content type Missed by EL&EP Missed by Disconnect
script 33.38% 35.27 %
big images 20.62% 21.73 %
text/html 13.77% 14.73 %
font 8.79% 0.09 %
invisible images 6.68% 12.21 %
stylesheet 6.17% 3.05 %
application/json 4.00% 4.83 %
others 6.59% 8.12%
Table 6. Top content type detected by BehaviorTrack and not
by filter lists on the 708, 308 requests missed by EL&EP and the
640, 809 missed by Disconnect
Service category EL&EP Disconnect
Content Servers 23.33 % 23.33 %
Social Networking 16.67 % 0.00%
Web Ads/Analytics 13.33 % 23.33 %
Search Engines/Portals 13.33 % 23.33 %
Technology/Internet 13.33 % 10.00 %
Consent frameworks 3.33 % 3.33 %
Travel 3.33 % 3.33 %
Non Viewable/Infrastructure 3.33 % 0.00%
Shopping 3.33 % 3.33 %
Business/Economy 3.33 % 6.67 %
Audio/Video Clips 3.33 % 0.00%
Suspicious 0.00% 3.33 %
Table 7. Categories of the top 30 tracking services detected by
BehaviorTrack and missed by the filter lists.
5.1.1 Tracking enabled by useful content
We analyzed the type of content provided by the remain-
ing tracking requests. Table 6 presents the top content
types used for tracking and not blocked by the filter
lists. We refer to images with dimensions larger than
50×50 pixels as Big images. These kind of images, text,
font and even stylesheet are used for tracking. The use
of these types of contents is essential for the proper func-
tioning of the website. That makes the blocking of re-
sponsible requests by the filter lists impossible. In fact,
the lists are explicitly allowing content from some of
these trackers to avoid the breakage of the website as
it’s the case for cse.google.com.
We categorized the top 30 third party services not
blocked by the filter lists but detected by BehaviorTrack
as performing tracking using Symantec’s WebPulse Site
Review [14] (Notice that differently from previous sec-
tions, where we analyzed the 2nd-level TLD, such as
google.com, here we report on full domain names,
such as cse.google.com that give us more informa-
tion about the service provided). New domains such
as consensu.org are not categorized properly so we
manually added a new category called “Consent frame-
works” to our categorization for such services. Table
7 represents the results of this categorization. Web
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Ads/Analytics represents 13.33% of the services missed
by EL&EP and 23.33% of those missed by Disconnect.
However, the remaining services are mainly categorized
as content servers, search engines and other functional
categories. They are tracking the user but not blocked
by the lists most likely not to break the websites.
5.1.2 Why useful content is tracking the user
Tracking enabled by a first party cookie: A cookie
set in the first party context can be considered as a
third party cookie in a different context. For example,
site.com cookie is a first party cookie when the user is
visiting site.com, but it becomes a third party when the
user is visiting a different website that includes content
from site.com. Whenever a request is sent to domain,
say site.com, the browser automatically attaches all the
cookies that are labeled with site.com to this request.
For example, when a user visits google.com, a first
party identifier cookie is set. Later on, when a user
visits w3school.com, a request is sent to the service
cse.google.com (Custom Search Engine by Google).
Along with the request, google’s identifier cookie is sent
to cse.google.com. The filter list cannot block such
a request, and is incapable of removing the first party
tracking cookies from it. In our example, filter lists
do not block the requests sent to cse.google.com on
329 different websites. In fact blocking cse.google.com
breaks the functionality of the website. Consequently,
an identifier cookie is sent to the cse.google.com al-
lowing it to track the user across websites.
By analyzing the requests missed by the lists,
we found that this behavior explains a significant
amount of missed requests: 44.61% requests (316, 008
out of 708, 308) missed by EL&EP and 32.00% requests
(205, 088 out of 640, 809) missed by Disconnect contain
cookies initially set in a first party context.
Tracking enabled by large scope cookies. A
cookie set with a 2nd-level TLD domain, can be ac-
cessed by all its subdmains. For example, a third party
sub.tracker.com sets a cookie in the user browser with
tracker.com as its domain. The browser sends this
cookie to another subdomain of tracker.com whenever
a request to that subdomain is made. As a result of this
practice, the identifier cookie set by a tracking subdo-
main with 2nd-level TLD domain, is sent to all other
subdomains even the ones serving useful content.
Large scope cookies are extremely prevalent among
requests missed by the filter lists. By analyzing the re-
quests missed by the lists, we found that 77.08% out of
Tracking behavior Prevalence
Basic tracking 83.90%
Basic tracking initiated by a tracker 13.50%
First to third party cookie syncing 1.42%
Analytics 1.00%
Third to third party cookie syncing 0.09%
Third party cookie forwarding 0.08%
Table 8. Distribution of tracking behaviors in the 379, 245 re-
quests missed by EL&EP and Disconnect.
22,606 third-party cookies used in the requests missed
by EL&EP and 75.41% out of 24,934 cookies used in
requests missed by Disconnect were set with a 2nd-level
TLD domain (such as tracker.com).
5.2 Panorama of missed trackers
To compare effectiveness of all lists EL&EP and Discon-
nect combined, we compare requests blocked by these
filter lists with requests detected by BehaviorTrack as
tracking according to classification from Figure 3. These
results are based on the dataset of 4, 216, 454 third-party
requests collected from 84, 658 pages of 8, 744 domains.
Overall, 379, 245 requests originating from 9,342
services (full third-party domains) detected by
BehaviorTrack are not blocked by EL&EP and Dis-
connect. Yet these requests are performing at least
one type of tracking, they represent 9.00% of all 4, 2M
third-party requests and appear in 68.70% of websites.
We have detected that the 379, 245 requests de-
tected by BehaviorTrack perform at least one of the
tracking behaviors presented in Figure 3. Table 8
shows the distribution of tracking behaviors detected by
BehaviorTrack. We notice that the most privacy-violating
behavior that includes setting, sending or syncing third-
party cookies is represented by the basic tracking that
is present in (83.90%) of missed requests.
Table 11 in Appendix presents top 15 domains de-
tected as trackers and missed by the filter lists. For each
domain, we extract its category, owners and country of
registration using whois library [48] and manual checks.
We also manually analyzed all the cookies associated to
tracking: out of the 15 presented domains, 7 are tracking
the user using persistent first party cookies. The cookie
of the search engine Baidu expires within 68 years while
the cookie associated to Qualtrics, an experience man-
agement company, expires in 100 years.
We found that content from code.jquery.com,
s3.amazonaws.com, and cse.google.com are explicitly
allowed by the filter lists on a list of predefined first-
party websites to avoid the breakage of these websites.
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We identified static.quantcast.mgr.consensu.org by
IAB Europe that rightfully should not be blocked be-
cause they provide useful functionality for GDPR com-
pliance. We detect that the cookie values seemed to be
unique identifiers, but are set without expiration date,
which means such cookies will get deleted when the user
closes her browser. Nevertheless, it is known that users
rarely close browsers, and more importantly, it is un-
clear why a consent framework system sets identifier
cookies even before the user clicks on the consent but-
ton (remember that we did not emit any user behavior,
like clicking on buttons or links during our crawls).
We identified tag managers – these tools are de-
signed to help Web developers to manage marketing and
tracking tags on their websites and can’t be blocked not
to break the functionality of the website. We detected
that two such managers, tags.tiqcdn.com by Tealium
and assets.adobedtm.com by Adobe track users cross-
sites, but have an explicit exception in EasyList.
6 Are browser extensions
effective at blocking trackers?
In this section, we analyze how effective are the popular
privacy protection extensions in blocking the privacy
leaks detected by BehaviorTrack. We study the following
extensions: Adblock [3], Ghostery [27], Disconnect [16],
and Privacy Badger [41]. The latest version of uBlock
Origin 1.22.2 is not working correctly with OpenWPM
under Firefox 52 which is the latest version of Firefox
runing on Openwpm that supports both web extensions
and statefull crawling. Hence we didn’t include ublock
Origin in our study.
We perform simultaneous stateful Web measure-
ments of Alexa top 10K websites using OpenWPM in
August 2019 in France. For each website, we visit the
homepage and 2 randomly chosen links on the homepage
from the same domain. Selection of links was made in
advance.
We consider the following measurement scenarios:
1. Firefox with no extension
2. Firefox with Adblock 3.33.0 (default settings)
3. Firefox with Ghostery 8.3.4 (activated blocking)
4. Firefox with Disconnect 5.19.3 (default settings)
5. Firefox with Privacy Badger 2019.7.11 (trained on
homepage and 2 links of top 1,000 Alexa websites)
Fig. 12. Third party requests allowed by privacy protecting
browser extensions out of 4,519,975 tracking requests.
Out of 30, 000 crawled pages 26, 594 were successfully
loaded by all the crawls. The following analysis are done
on this set of pages.
Figure 12 represents the effectiveness of the ex-
tensions in blocking the tracking requests detected by
BehaviorTrack. Our results show that Ghostery is the
most efficient among them. However, it still fails to block
26.72% of tracking requests. All extensions miss all three
tracking classes, except Disconnect and Privacy Badger
that has an efficient Analytics blocking mechanism: they
are missing Analytics behavior on only 0.31% and 0.18%
of the pages respectively. Most tracking requests missed
by the extensions are performing Explicit tracking.
Conclusion: Similarly to Merzdovnik et al.[35], we
show that tracker blockers (Disconnect, Ghostery and
Badger) are more efficient than adblockers (Adblock)
in blocking tracking behaviors. However, all studied ex-
tensions miss at least 26.72% of tracking detected by
BehaviorTrack. This shows that even though the exten-
sions reduce the amount of tracking performed, they do
not solve the problem of protecting users from tracking.
7 Discussion
Our results show that there are numerous problems in
the cookie-based third party tracking. In this section we
raise these problems and address them to various actors.
Browser vendors. We observed that first party
cookies can be exploited in a third party context to per-
form cross site tracking. In its Intelligent Tracking Pre-
vention 2.0 introduced in 2018, Safari allowed cookies
to be used in a third party context only in the initial 24
hours. Such time frame could be limited even further,
however this approach requires rigorous testing with end
users. Other browser vendors should follow Safari and
prohibit the usage of cookies in a third party context.
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Web standardization organizations. While
third-party consent provides useful features to the web-
site, it is also capable of tracking users. We have shown
that third party domains serving functional content
such as Content Servers or Search Engines may track
the user with identifier cookies. We have noticed that
we detect such tracking because the domain behind such
functional content does not set but only receives iden-
tifier cookies that are already present in the browser
an were initially set with the 2nd-level domain as host,
which makes the cookie accessible by all subdomains.
Even if the tracking is not intentional, and the domain
is not using the identifier cookie it receives to create
user’s profile currently, this cookie leakage is still a pri-
vacy concern that could be exploited by the service any-
time. We therefore believe that the web standardization
bodies, such as W3C, could propose to limit the scope
of the cookies and not send it to all the subdomains.
Supervisory bodies When a supervisory body,
such as a Data Protection Authority in EU, has to in-
vestigate and find a responsible for tracking happening
on a website, it is a very complex task to assign lia-
bility to the setting or sending of identifier cookies. In
our work, we have identified tracking initiators – third
party domains that only redirect or include other do-
mains that perform tracking. Such tracking initiators,
that we detected on 11.24% of websites, are partially
liable for tracking. Another example is CDNs: we have
observed that requests or responses for fetching a jQuery
library from code.jquery.com contains identifier cook-
ies. Turns out, it is a Cloudflare CDN that inserts a
cookie named __cfduid into its traffic in order “to iden-
tify malicious visitors to our Customers’ websites”.
Conclusion. Our work raises numerous concerns in
the area of tracking detection and privacy protection of
Web users. We believe that the our work can be used
to improve existing tracking detection approaches, but
nevertheless various actors need to revise their practices
when it comes to the scope and usage of cookies, and
third parties should exclude third party tracking from
the delivery of functional website content.
8 Related Work
In this section we first overview previous works on mea-
suring invisible pixels. We then examine state-of-the-
art techniques to detect online tracking: behavior-based
techniques and methods leveraging the filter lists.
8.1 Invisible pixels, known as web bugs
Invisible pixels are extensively studied starting form
2001 [6, 18, 34, 36, 44]. Invisible pixels, called “web
bugs” in previous works, were primarily used to set and
send third-party cookies attached to the request or re-
sponse when the browser fetches such image. In 2003,
Martin et al. [34] found that 58% of 84 most popular
websites and 36% of 289 random websites contain at
least one web bug. In 2002, Alsaid and Martin [6] de-
ployed a tool (Bugnosis) to detect the web bugs. The
main goal of the tool was to raise awareness among the
public. It was used by more than 100,000 users. How-
ever, it was only generating warning messages without
actively blocking the bugs and was only supported by
Internet Explorer 5 that is deprecated today. Dobias[18]
showed that web bugs lead to new privacy threats, such
as fingerprinting.
Ruohonen and Leppänen [44], studied the presence
of invisible pixels in Alexa’s top 500 websites. They
showed that invisible pixels are still widely used. Dif-
ferently from our work, where we detect all effectively
delivered images from the response headers, the authors
analyze the source code of landing HTML page and ex-
tract images from the <img> tag. Such method misses
an important number of images that are dynamically
loaded. The significant number of studies on invisible
pixels shows that it is a well known problem. The goal
of our study is different: we aim to use invisible pixels
that are still widely present on the Web to detect differ-
ent tracking behaviors and collaborations.
8.2 Detection of online tracking
Detection of trackers by analysing behavior:
Roesner et al. [43] and Lerner et al. [31] were the first to
analyze trackers based on their behavior. They have pro-
posed a classification of tracking behaviors that make a
distinction between analytics and cross-domain track-
ing. We, however, propose a more fine-grained classifi-
cation of tracking behaviors that includes not only pre-
viously known behaviors, but also specific categories of
cookie sharing and syncing (see Section 3). Yu et al.[49],
identify trackers by detecting unsafe data without tak-
ing into account the behavior of the third party domain
and the communications between trackers.
Previous studies [1, 11, 24, 38, 39] measured cookie
syncing on websites and users.
Olejnik et al. [38] consider cookies with sufficiently
long values to be identifiers. If such identifier is shared
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between domains, then it is classified as cookie sync-
ing. Additionally, Olejnik et al. [38] studied the case of
doubleclick to detect cookie syncing based on the URL
patterns. In our study, we show that domains are using
more complex techniques to store and share identifier
cookies. We base our technique for detecting identifier
cookies on the work of Acar et al. [1], and Englehardt
and Narayanan [24], who only checked for the identifiers
that are stored and shared in a clear text. In our work,
we detect more cases of cookie synchronization because
we detect encoded cookies and even encrypted ones in
the case of doubleclick.net. Bashir et al. [11] used ads
to detect cookie syncing. They filter out all images with
dimensions lower than 50×50 pixels which excludes in-
visible pixels. We show that cookie syncing is used with
invisible images as well.
Papadopoulos et al. [39] used a year long dataset
from real mobile users to study cookie syncing. The
authors detect not only syncing done through clear
text, but encrypted cookie syncing as well. Hence, they
cover DS, PC and ES sharing techniques detected by
BehaviorTrack (see Figure 2), but they miss the remain-
ing techniques that represent 39.03% of the cookie shar-
ing that we detect. Moreover, they only focus on cookie
syncing, while we conduct a more in depth study of dif-
ferent tracking behaviors extracted from invisible pixels
dataset, and we compare our tracking detection to filter
lists and the most popular privacy extensions.
Detection of trackers with filter lists: To de-
tect domains related to tracking or advertisement, most
of the previous studies [10–12, 23, 24, 28–30, 42] rely on
filter lists, such as EasyList [20] and EasyPrivasy [21]
(EL&EP) that became the de facto approach to detect
trackers. Only from the las three years we identified 9
papers that rely on EL&EP to detect third-party track-
ing and advertising (see Table 12 in the Appendix).
Englehardt and Narayanan [24] seminal work on
measuring trackers on 1 million websites relies on
EL&EP as a ground truth to detect requests to track-
ers and ad-related domains. Three papers by Bashir et
al. [10–12] customize EL&EP to detect 2nd-level do-
mains of tracking and ad companies: to eliminate false
positives, a domain is considered if it appears in the
dataset more than 10% of the time in the dataset.
Lauinger et al. [30] use EL&EP to identify advertising
and tracking content in order to detect what content has
included outdated and vulnerable JavaScript libraries in
Web applications. Razaghpanah et al. [42] use EasyList
as an input to their classifier to identify advertising and
tracking domains in Web and mobile ecosystems. Ikram
et al. [28] analysed how many tracking JavaScript li-
braries are blocked by EL&EP based on 95 websites.
Englehardt et al. [23] apply EL&EP on third-party leaks
caused by invisible images in emails. Iordanou et al. [29]
rely on EL&EP as a ground truth for detecting ad- and
tracking-related third party requests. Only one work by
Papadopoulos et al. [40] use Disconnect list [17] to de-
tect tracking domains. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first who compares the behavior-based detection
method to filter lists extensively used in the literature.
Effectiveness of filter lists: Merzdovnik et al
[35] studied the effectiveness of the most popular track-
ing blocking extensions. They evaluate how many third
party requests are blocked by each extension. In their
evaluation, they don’t distinguish tracking third party
requests from non tracking ones, which affect their eval-
uation. In our work, we detect trackers using a behavior-
based detection method and then we evaluate how much
of these trackers are blocked. Das et.al [15], studied the
effectiveness of filter lists against tracking scripts that
misuse sensors on mobile. They show that filter lists fail
to block the scripts that access the sensors. We instead
evaluate effectiveness of filter lists against third party re-
quests in web applications that contain identifier cookie
9 Conclusion
Web tracking remains an important problem for privacy
of Web users. Even after the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) came in force in May 2018, third
party companies continue tracking users with various
sophisticated techniques based on cookies without their
consent. According to our study, 91.92% of websites in-
corporate at least one type of cookie-based tracking.
In this paper, we define a new classification of Web
tracking behaviors, thanks to a large scale study of in-
visible pixels collected from 84, 658 webpages. We then
applied our classification to the full dataset which al-
lowed us to uncover different relationships between do-
mains. The redirection process and the different behav-
iors that a domain can adopt are an evidence of the
complexity of these relationships. We show that even
the most popular consumer protection lists and browser
extensions fail to detect these complex behaviors. There-
fore, behavior-based tracking detection should be more
widely adopted.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Detecting identifier sharing
GA sharing: Google-analytics serves invisible pixels
on 69.89% of crawled domains as we show in Figure 13.
By analyzing our data, we detect that the cookie set
by google-analytics script is of the form GAX.Y.Z.C,
while the identifier cookies sent in the parameter value
to google-analytics is actually Z.C. This case is not
detected by the previous cookie syncing detection tech-
niques for two reasons. First, "." is not considered as
a delimiter. Second, even if it was considered as a de-
limiter, it would create a set of values {GAX, Y, Z, C}
which are still different than the real value Z.C used as
an identifier by google-analytics.
Base64 sharing: When a domain wants to share
its identifier cookie with doubleclick.net, it should
encode it in base64 before sending [19]. For example,
when adnxs.com sends a request to doubleclick.net,
it includes a random string into a URL parameter. This
string is the base64 encoding of the value of the cookie
set by adnxs.com in the user’s browser.
Encrypted sharing: When doubleclick.net
wants to share its identifier cookie with some other
domain, it encrypts the cookie before sending, which
makes it impossible to detect. Instead we rely on the
semantic set by doubleclick to share this identifier that
we extract from its documentation [19].
Assume that doubleclick.net is willing to share
an identifier cookie with adnxs.com. To do so, Dou-
bleclick requires that the content of adnxs.com in-
cludes an image tag, pointing to a RL that con-
tains doubleclick.net as destination and a parame-
ter google_nid. The value of google_nid will tell Dou-
bleclick that adnxs.com was the initiator of this re-
quest. Upon receiving such request, doubleclick.net
sends a redirection response pointing to a URL
that contains adnxs.com as destination with en-
crypted doubleclick.net’s cookies in the parame-
ters. When the browser receives this response, it
redirects to adnxs.com, who now receives encrypted
doubleclick.net’s cookie.
We detect such behavior by detecting requests
to doubleclick.net with google_nid parameter and
analysing the following redirection. If we notice that
the redirection is set to a concrete domain, for exam-
ple adnxs.com, we conclude that doubleclick.net has
shared its cookie with this domain.
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10.2 Additional results
Figure 13 represents the Top 20 domains involved in
invisible pixels inclusion in the 8, 744 domains.
Fig. 13. Top 20 domains responsible for serving invisible pixels
Table 9 presents the top 10 domains using their
cookie key to store the identifier.
Host # cookies instances
lpsnmedia.net 583
i-mobile.co.jp 223
rubiconproject.com 83
justpremium.com 72
juicyads.com 64
kinoafisha.info 64
aktualne.cz 63
maximonline.ru 61
sexad.net 47
russian7.ru 45
Table 9. Top 10 domains storing the identifier as key.
Figure 14 represents the Top 15 third parties receiv-
ing the identifier cookies. Google-analytics is the top do-
main receiving identifiers in over 4% of the visited web-
sites. Table 10 presents the top 10 third parties sharing
their identifiers with google-analytics.
Figure 15 presents the top 15 analytics domains in
our dataset of 8,744 domains.
Table 12 summarizes the usage of EL&EP lists in
the previous works that we describe in Section 8.
Fig. 14. Third party cookie forwarding : Top 15 receivers in 8, 744
domains.
Third parties # requests
adtrue.com 298
google.com 123
architonic.com 120
bidgear.com 80
akc.tv 76
insticator.com 73
coinad.com 64
performgroup.com 52
chaturbate.com 47
2mdnsys.com 40
Table 10. Third party cookie forwarding; Top 10 third parties
forwarding cookies to google-analytics.
Fig. 15. Analytics: Top 15 receivers in the 8, 744 domains.
Detecting Unknown Trackers via Invisible Pixels 19
Tracking enabled by a first party cookie
Full domain Prevalence of
tracking in
first-parties
Cookie name Cookie
expiration
Category Company Country
code.jquery.com 756 ( 8.65 %) __cfduid 1 years Technology/Internet jQuery Foundation US
s3.amazonaws.com 412 ( 4.71 %) s_fid 5 years Content Servers Amazon US
ampcid.google.com 282 ( 3.23 %) NID 6 months Search Engines Google LLC US
cse.google.com 307 ( 3.51 %) NID 1 year Search Engines Google LLC US
use.fontawesome.com 221 ( 2.53 %) __stripe_mid 1 years Technology/Internet WhoisGuard Protected _
siteintercept.qualtrics.com 99 ( 1.13 %) t_uid 100 years Business/Economy Qualtrics, LLC US
push.zhanzhang.baidu.com 98 ( 1.12 %) BAIDUID 68 years Search Engines Beijing Baidu Netcom Science
Technology Co., Ltd.
CN
Tracking enabled in a third party context
assets.adobedtm.com 427 ( 4.88 %) _gd_visitor 20 years Technology/Internet Adobe Inc. US
yastatic.net 303 ( 3.47 %) cto_lwid 1 year Technology/Internet Yandex N.V. RU
s.sspqns.com 278 ( 3.18 %) tuuid 6 months Web
Ads/Analytics
HI-MEDIA FR
tags.tiqcdn.com 276 ( 3.16 %) utag_main 1 year Content Servers Tealium Inc US
cdnjs.cloudflare.com 206 ( 2.36 %) __cfduid 1 year Content Servers Cloudflare US
static.quantcast.mgr.
consensu.org
157 ( 1.80 %) _cmpQc3pChkKey Session Consent
frameworks
IAB Europe BE
a.twiago.com 133 ( 1.52 %) deuxesse_uxid 1 month Office/Business
Applications
REDACTED FOR PRIVACY _
g.alicdn.com 121 ( 1.38 %) _uab_collina 10 years Content Servers Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. CN
Table 11. Top 15 domains missed by EL&EP and Disconnect but detected by BehaviorTrack to perform tracking.
Table 12. Usage of EL&EP lists in security, privacy and web measurement community (venues form 2016-2018). “Detection” describes
how EL&EP was used to detect trackers: whether the filterlists were applied only on all requests, on requests and follow-up requests
that would be blocked, or whether filterlists were further customised before being applied to the dataset. “Dependency” describes
whether the results of the paper rely on EL&EP or authors use these lists to only vefiy their results.
Paper Venue EasyList EasyPrivacy Detection Dependency
Englehardt and Narayanan [24] ACM CCS 2016 X X Req. Rely
Bashir et al. [11] USENIX Security 2016 X Custom. Rely
Lauinger et al. [30] NDSS 2017 X X Req.+Follow Rely
Razaghpanah et al. [42] NDSS 2018 X Custom. Rely
Ikram et al. [28] PETs 2017 X Req.+Follow Verif.
Englehardt et al.[23] PETs 2018 X X Req.+Follow Verif.
Bashir and Wilson [12] PETs 2018 X X Custom. Rely+Verif.
Bashir et al.[10] IMC 2018 X X Custom. Rely
Iordanou et al.[29] IMC 2018 X X Req.+Follow Rely
